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Introduction 1 
This paper explores which measures used to 
deal with the Year 2000 (Y2K) problem are also 
applicable to the future security of information 
networks in critical infrastructure. As informa-
tion and communications technology (ICT) 
become ever more widespread, protection of 
both the information and the infrastructure upon 
which it relies becomes important as financial 
transactions and economies become increasingly 
global and interdependent. The Y2K problem, 
whereby computers with two digit year format-
ting are not able to read 00 as the year 2000, 
meant that errors would occur in many proc-
esses and calculations, such as billing, manufac-
turing and trade, in both the public and the 
private sector around the world. After January 
2000 had passed, other computer incidents 
occurred such as the distributed-denial-of-
service attacks in the US in February 2000 and 
the ILOVEYOU virus attacks globally in May 
2000. Furthermore, high-level attention to 
international ICT developments was paid in July 
2000 at the G-8 Summit of industrialised coun-
tries and at the annual meeting of the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC); these all sustained the importance 
of information infrastructure and its protection. 
This paper will first assess the steps under-
taken by governments, industry and international 
organizations to deal with the Year 2000 (Y2K) 
issue. The motivations behind the effort and 
requirements for fixing this problem varied not 
only between these three groupings but also 
within them. For example, advanced western 
nations and developing countries were influ-
enced by different factors. The second part of 
the paper will make some preliminary assess-
ments of how representative the Y2K problem 
was of other threats to and vulnerabilities of 
information systems. Then, various factors that 
contributed to managing the Y2K issue will be 
examined for their applicability to information 
infrastructure protection. While government and 
industry cooperation was a predominant element 
in dealing with Y2K, this and other factors, such 
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as the spread of good management practices and 
the work of international organizations, are 
equally important to critical information infra-
structure protection. 
The Y2K problem is presented as a case 
study of a threat to or vulnerability in the infor-
mation networks of critical infrastructure. Given 
the potential large scale and global scope of the 
impact of the Y2K problem, it was a valuable 
example from which to assess the vulnerabilities 
of critical infrastructure, and thus also the 
means of protecting it. The Y2K issue was both 
a simple technical problem'readily understood 
and also a complex issue in that it involved all 
sectors of society, including those critical 
infrastructures with complex interdependencies 
which, if they were to fail, had potential for 
large-scale adverse consequences. 
The critical infrastructure of a nation is 
defined as those assets upon which the security 
and economic and social viability of a country 
rely. In this paper, they comprise the assets of 
the energy and communications sectors upon 
which financial, governmental and emergency 
services depend. Other sector assets such as 
food, water-treatment plants, manufacturing 
plants, the oil and gas industries, and transporta-
tion are included in broader definitions of critical 
infrastructure, but these sectors, too, rely 
ultimately on energy and communications 
systems. Over the past decade, information 
technologies have increasingly been used in 
these infrastructure assets to improve controls 
and monitoring of processes as well as business 
transactions, and therefore the security of these 
information networks in the critical infrastruc-
tures requires examination. 
The Y2K problem was expected to impact 
upon the energy and communication sectors in 
different ways: on the one hand with an'immedi-
ate noticeable failure, and on the other a cascad-
ing or perpetuation of errors in systems that 
otherwise appear to be working as normal. 
These two sectors and error types, while 
general and broadly defined, indicate that critical 
infrastructure is not a monolithic entity, but 
composed of different technologies and related 
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systems which require protection of not only 
information but also physical assets. 
Motivations for dealing with Y2K 
Governments, industry, and international 
organizations are the focus of examination as 
they own, manage and regulate critical infra-
structure, and these three types of entity each 
differed in their motivation and approach to 
fixing the Y2K problem. The focus on these 
categories, however, does not mean the 
efforts of many other individuals and organi-
zations that also took an active role in dealing 
with the issue were unimportant. Critical 
national infrastructure underpins the opera-
tions of governments and economies, there-
fore, its protection is also a matter of national 
security. 
Governments were motivated to deal with the 
Y2K issue by concern with security and law and 
order, as well as the smooth running of govern-
ment services. The confidence of the public 
therefore was a prerequisite and led govern-
ments to encourage disclosure of information 
about how the problem had been dealt with. 
Such a view was adopted primarily by the US 
and UK governments which led the world in 
efforts to raise awareness of the problem. The 
US and to a lesser extent the UK and Japan are 
heavily dependent on computer systems and 
having the largest financial centers as well as 
strong industrial and IT sectors, these countries 
had global interests in making sure the problem 
had been fixed. Reflecting part of this global 
concern, the US and the UK were the main 
contributors to the World Bank's Information 
for Development Program (known as infoDev) 
which offered non-OECD countries grants for 
assistance with their Y2K problems. In develop-
ing countries, which are less dependent on 
computerized or digital automated systems, 
raising awareness of the problem in a similar 
way to that adopted by the US was believed to 
be unnecessarily alarming to their publics, or not 
considered as important enough in light of other 
more pressing social, political, and economic 
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problems. These views were held in October 
19992, even after the June 1999 UN-mandated 
2" Global National Y2K Coordinators conference 
in New York, where more than 170 countries 
attended to discuss and compare how countries 
were preparing for the impact of the Y2K 
problem. 
Not surprisingly, security was the main 
motivation behind action by ministries of 
defense and other national security organiza-
tions. They too relied on effective communica-
tions and energy supplies to be able to maintain 
existing military operations, ani! assist with 
humanitarian relief operations to alleviate Y2K-
induced disasters, if required. Additionally, much 
public attention was devoted to the possible 
impact of the Y2K problem on nuclear-armed 
missiles, and thus the nuclear weapons states, 
particularly the US and Russia, turned attention 
to showing the public that these particular 
weapon systems and associated early-warning 
systems were secure. 
While public attention was on high profile 
areas such as nuclear-armed missiles, commer-
cial aircraft, and civil nuclear power plants, 
these are complex systems which are potentially 
vulnerable to hazardous impacts of all kinds, and 
thus have been heavily regulated for safety and 
made subject to stringent physical protection 
measures for decades. Redundancy of safety 
mechanisms, the shift from manual to auto-
mated systems and layered contingency proce-
dures were ways to reduce the risk and impact 
of errors in such complex systems.' 
Industry was motivated to fix the Y2K 
problem by concerns about liability for damage 
caused by Y2K disruptions and by the impact 
upon profits, as well as reputation. In the US 
and UK, and in varying degrees throughout 
Western Europe, the private sector owns and/or 
operates upwards of 90% of national critical 
infrastructure. In developing countries, many 
electricity utilities and communications facilities 
are still owned and operated by government, 
though deregulation of these sectors has already 
begun. The approaches to fixing the Y2K prob-
lem by advanced countries, therefore, were 
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quite different from those undertaken by devel-
oping countries. Not until after January I, 2000 
did factors emerge that more clearly explained 
the low level ofY2K disruptions in developing 
countries. These factors included the degree to 
which a relatively small number of vendors of 
critical infrastructure could provide a more 
uniform approach on how best to conduct fixes 
in their respective sector. Secondly, developing 
countries "leap-frogged'" by benefiting from the 
research and "homework" done in more compu-
ter-dependent countries, in particular from the 
best practices that were spread by multinational 
companies abroad. Lower levels of automation 
and government-owned infrastructures meant 
that centralised approaches facilitated Y2K 
repairs as well as contingency planning once the 
urgency was understood. 
The major international governmental organi-
zations associated with dealing with the Y2K 
problem were primarily the United Nations-
mandated International Y2K Cooperation Centre 
(IYCC), and those organizations that have a 
regulatory role which includes assuring safety 
of a sector. These organizations include the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO), as well as international trade and 
industry associations such as the International 
Energy Association (oil and gas) and the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). The 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the 
Information Technology Association of America 
(ITAA) and the American Petroleum Institute, 
while specific to the United States, also had 
international influence on fixing the problem 
which was a potential safety hazard if not fixed. 
The international governmental organizations 
issued statements and guidelines and requested 
that their member states take appropriate meas-
ures to ensure that Y2K was fixed or its effects 
mitigated. Though repair or replace efforts were 
paid for by either member states or private 
owners of equipment, and any expected disrup-
tions would have local impact, the international 
organizations were able to use their regulatory 
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role to place pressure on and coordinate govern-
mental efforts in these particular sectors. 
International organizations were able to 
harmonize efforts among governments world-
wide, while large multinational companies were 
able to spread best practices; the private sector 
had unprecedented cooperation with govern-
ments in advanced countries while multinational 
corporations worked with governments in the 
developing countries in which they operated. 
While it was not formal, there was a system of 
interaction between governments, industry and 
international organizations to deal with repair 
efforts. This cooperation also continued when 
global Internet schemes were being established 
to monitor and share information about potential 
Y2K disturbances as they occurred. world wide 
during the roll-over period from December 31, 
1999 to at least January 3, 2000. 
Expectations in 1999 of potential 
impact of Y2K 
From late 1998 to early 1999, before widespread 
disclosure of information about how effectively 
efforts to fix the Y2K had been, the expectations 
among the public and some organizations as to 
how the Y2K problem would impact upon them 
varied from apocalyptic disruption to not much 
more than a nuisance. The US, by far the most 
reliable on ICT, appeared to be the only country 
in which a small sector of the population, for 
example, some survivalist and particular con-
servative Christian groups, expected apocalyptic 
or worst-case scenarios; a "Christian Y2K 
Relocation" site was on offer in Minnesota for 
$64,000. S More of the US population, though 
not expecting disaster, nevertheless prepared for 
a heavy three-day storm, and acquired back-up 
or emergency generators and foodstuffs. 
Various surveys were undertaken to assess 
public expectation and industry expectations of 
the disruptions that might occur. One series of 
surveys was conducted by Bruce Webste'" for 
the Washington D.C. Year 2000 Group, in 
March and May 1998, and in June and Novem-
ber 1999. 2000 email addressees were asked to 
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predict the impact ofY2K in the US in five 
different sectors on an escalating scale of 0 
(celebratory) to 10 (apocalyptic). The June 
survey was more optimistic than the ones in 
1998. From the usable data of 337 respondents 
from a range of professions, there were three 
areas of consensus: "that the social impact will 
be modest (65% saw it in the 0-4 range); that 
the government is not as prepared as it claims to 
be (74% saw it in the 4-10 range) and that 
infrastructure ... will be impacted more broadly 
than is generally asserted (65% saw it in the 4-
10 range". Generally there was also a division 
between those who expected not much to occur 
and those who "described organizations far 
behind in their Y2K efforts (and usually covering 
it up)". By the December 1999 survey, the 
results had become more optimistic, reflecting a 
decreasing concern in the US that the Y2K 
problem would result in serious disruption. 
While the above survey was to assess per-
ceptions of what would occur, surveys were 
also made to try to assess what countries were 
actually doing, on the basis that as more infor-
mation was ~own then there would be less 
apprehension among the public and industry. 
One of the most prominent studies for assessing 
country readiness around the globe was that 
conducted by the Gartner Group consultancy 
organization. Its surveys from autumn 1998 
placed countries in rank order ofY2K readiness, 
based on a number of factors including the state 
of preparedness for dealing with the Y2K prob-
lem and a country's dependence on information 
technology (IT). Warburg Dillon Read, an 
organization similar to the Gartner Group, used 
these two rankings, subtracting the readiness 
ranking from that of the one on IT dependency, 
to calculate an aggregate measure of vulnerabil-
ity. Their results indicated that the countries 
likely to be most affected were the Philippines, 
Russia, China and Indonesia, with the countries 
least likely to be affected being the US, Nether-
lands and Sweden.' The information was based 
on first quarter 1999 data, and it would not have 
been appropriate to use it as a basis for making 
conclusions later in the year when developing 
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countries as well as smaller industries had taken 
big steps to deal with the problem. Information 
that was more than three months old was soon 
outdated. Nevertheless, in October 1999, ad-
equate information about Y2K readiness appears 
still not to have been known or believed with 
reports in the US indicating that Russia, and to a 
lesser extent, China, were still main areas of 
concern. Gathering information around the 
world on the status of Y2K efforts required 
travelling abroad rather than merely relying on 
the media whose reporters either were not 
technical experts or were more interested in 
looking for sensationalist stories. 
The focus on readiness, however, was only a 
partial approach to dealing with the Y2K prob-
lem. While knowledge that Y2K repairs or 
upgrades had taken place might lessen public 
jitters about disruptions on December 31, 2000, 
by spring 1999 companies and governments 
realised that not all computers could be fixed. As 
importantly, governments and industries realized 
that it was no longer enough to have one's own 
systems repaired, but also to know about the 
efforts undertaken by the company's suppliers 
and distributors as they, too, either directly or 
indirectly, affected company operations. In 
particular, the interdependencies between the 
telecommunications and energy sectors became 
evident. Decisions therefore had to be made as 
to which computers were considered most 
important, or mission critical, to be fixed first 
for core government or business operations to 
be maintained. In addition to such "triage", 
governments and businesses, including infra-
structure operators, focused on contingency 
planning for the rest of 1999 to ensure provision 
of service in case disruptions occurred. In the 
more computer dependent countries, a tension 
arose for senior officials who had to demon-
strate readiness while also having to make 
contingency planning - the latter being less well 
understood by the public and, for some persons, 
calling into question government claims of 
readiness. 
Even in the weeks before December 31, 
1999, there remained uncertainty as to how Y2K 
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would affect information infrastructure. The 
telecommunications networks expected conges-
tion shortly after each time zone reached mid-
night, but this was a problem of capacity, not of 
Y2K. The basic switching of telecommunica-
tions networks did not have the Y2K problem to 
begin with, but the billing, payment, monitoring 
and other auxiliary functions that used the basic 
switching systems were expected to incur 
errors. There would not be a complete outage, 
but systems would appear to be functioning as 
normal except that errors occurred in the dates 
or in calculations using dates. 
In the energy sector, however, there were 
expectations that embedded chips in utilities, gas 
and oil plants and large complex systems would, 
if not fixed, cause systems to stop. Embedded 
chips, of which only about 3-5% of the 25 
billion produced had a date function, and even 
then only those which had data being input 
required assessing. The chip micro-code was 
almost impossible to test for every possible logic 
sequence and combined with the software and 
hardware in these large plants often being 
bespoke and updated according to local require-
ments, these factors also meant there would be 
a degree of randomness in the occurrence of a 
Y2K disruption. Precautionary measures were 
part of contingency planning and thus many 
complex plants, utilities, mills, chemical plants 
and other factories, had controlled shutdowns 
or rescheduled maintenance programs. This 
process was made easier as the holiday season 
was a period of slowed activity in any event.' 
Additionally, as safety is a concern for many 
complex systems, existing in-house emergency 
services and contingency plans for most mis-
haps and disasters, for example, using back-up 
generators for loss of electricity or switching to 
manual systems, adapted those measures to 
accommodate the Y2K problem. 
What happened? 
The Y2K problem has not resulted in long-term 
strategic or catastrophic security impacts or 
affected the stability of stock markets or econo-
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mies. Despite glowing press reports of few Y2K 
incidents, it is evident that many Y2K disrup-
tions had occurred but technical staff on duty, 
being the best and brightest, were able to make 
a quick fix or work around the problems and 
thus prevent or mitigate a reportable failure. The 
IYCC and the US Senate Committee on the Year 
2000 Technology Problem each produced lists 
of Y2K disturbances occurring in more than 75 
countries around the world.' The Y2K disruption 
to operations of the US reconnaissance and 
French Syracuse II communications satellites 
would have been the closest to affecting issues 
oftraditional national security that have been 
observed. These did not, however, appear to 
result in serious security problems at that time. 
There were few or no confirmed reports of 
major power outages or communications fail-
ures in countries. The main communications 
issues were problems of congestion just shortly 
after the rollover occurred in a country. Regard-
ing energy, there were planned reductions of 
service as part of precautionary measures to 
prevent unexpected surges; there were reports 
of minor outages in parts of South America. 
There were about fourteen reports of Y2K 
glitches in civil nuclear power plants. These 
took place primarily in Japan, Spain, the UK, 
and US, and did not cause safety problems or 
loss of power production. 
Governments and industries and international 
organizations each had their own requirements 
for implementing not only plans for repairs and 
contingency but also the reporting ofY2K 
incidents. Thus there were varied types of 
reports; for example, industry used help desks 
or existing emergency procedures to assess Y2K 
disruptions at the technical level, while govern-
ments were more concerned about the possible 
effects on public order. Reporting systems 
which made their results public tended to 
emphasize impact and failure, rather than cause. 
Information tended to be filtered to protect 
commercial proprietary information or for 
security reasons. Dealing with the temporary 
fixes as well as non-mission critical systems 
was delayed until some later date when re-
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sources would be available and media attention 
had diminished. Excepting concern about the 
leap year date, which also did not result in major 
incidents, latent effects since the end of Febru-
ary 2000 appear not to have been reported, even 
if they have occurred. 
Protection of critical information infra-
structure 
The Y2K problem varies in how closely it is 
representative of the kinds of disruptions ex-
pected to affect information infrastructure. 
While the Y2K problem is studied from many 
perspectives given its pervasiveness through all 
sectors of society, it can be seen as a surrogate 
attack on critical infrastructure.'· The potentially 
large impact of the Y2K problem, if repairs had 
not been made, was compared to that from 
natural disaster or other worst-case scenarios. It 
was, however, a known risk with a fixed date 
and time and occurred in an "artificial" environ-
ment as many systems were turned off, on 
controlled shutdowns, or not subject to regular 
activity over a holiday period. 
The Y2K problem was a vulnerability that is 
defined as a weakness or feature that exists 
within a computer or communications network 
and infrastructure. The Y2K problem emerged 
from a narrow specification in the formatting of 
dates in computers, with two rather than four 
digits used to represent the year. This was a 
response to what were at the time more serious 
problems of computer memory space and cost 
in the early development of computers during 
the 1950s and 1960s. This formatting, however, 
became a vulnerability as successive generations 
of many computers had not corrected it, and, in 
many cases, the specification could be worked 
around. Many software developers were not 
interested in dealing with this issue, as it was 
not an interesting or challenging problem to 
solve. 
Threats, however, are intentions and capabili-
ties that can use vulnerabilities for unauthorized 
use, theft or damage to the information or 
network or infrastructure. They include dis-
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gruntled employees, "hactivists", criminals, and 
professional "infowarriors" working either for 
governments or corporate entities. These are 
more widely known in the communications 
sector, and security measures such as password 
and access controls, and encryption are among 
measures often taken to protect information 
from malicious activity. While the Y2K problem 
was a vulnerability it was often called a threat to 
galvanize corrective action. The Y2K problem 
was often compared to natural disasters, which 
are categorized by some as threats given the 
large scale of damage and devastation that often 
ensues, but natural disasters do not have mali-
cious intent. 
Conclusion 
The problems for critical information infrastruc-
ture are of two kinds: malicious attacks, and 
vulnerabilities of software, hardware and appli-
cations design and implementation. During the 
1990s, the plant in the energy sector and in 
heavier industries have increasingly relied on 
information and communications technology to 
monitor plant control and processes, as well as 
to automate business transactions. One of the 
main lessons for infrastructure owners, there-
fore, in particular within the energy sector, is 
the degree to which incorporating more IT 
requires a corresponding understanding of both 
the threats and vulnerabilities which will arise. 
Utility and plant owners and operators have for 
decades put into place contingency planning for 
many kinds of scenarios that affect their physi-
cal systems. Thus planning for contingency and 
for safety was the norm for critical infrastruc-
ture owners, and thus provided a sound basis 
upon which to prepare contingency planning for 
Y2K disruptions. Issues of information assur-
ance to deal with the new IT issues, which tend 
to be better understood in the communications 
sector, therefore, will need to be integrated with 
more traditional practices related to physical 
plant and asset protection. 
While threats can be managed by adopting 
some of the various security measures men-
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tioned above, the Y2K experience illustrates the 
importance of adopting good practices for 
management of technology and information." 
Unlike the Y2K problem, which was seen as a 
one-off incident, management and security is a 
process, and while receiving less media attention 
than do hackers, it can be more important than 
preventing malicious attacks. More than 50% of 
computer disruptions arise from poor IT project 
implementation (75% of large computer projects 
are delayed, over budget and do not work as 
intended), flaws in software, improper configu-
ration of computers and human error. Good IT 
management can minimize these, thereby allow-
ing more attention to be devoted to dealing with 
malicious attacks. 
To facilitate implementation oftechnology 
and information management various interna-
tional standards exist and new ones are emerg-
ing. Prominent examples for consideration 
include the International Organization for Stand-
ardization (ISO) 9000 series for quality assur-
ance management. Secondly, in the UK, in 
September 1999, the Turnhull Report of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England 
and Wales requires companies to raise risk 
assessment to the level of Board of Directors. 
This means accountability for disruptions and 
other irregularities would be in the company's 
Annual Report and dealt with by other regular 
review procedures. Thirdly, a management 
system standard for information security is the 
British Standards Institute standard BS 7799 
which has been submitted to be an international 
standard in the ISO series. 
The Y2K experience also demonstrated the 
effectiveness of government-industry coopera-
tion to solve complex issues. This cooperation is 
increasingly important for critical information 
infrastructure protection. The private owners of 
infrastructure have direct experience of both 
vulnerabilities and threats to their assets, but as 
their systems are critical to a country's eco-
nomic viability and social and political well-
being, then governments require knowledge of 
incidents of a malicious nature to better fulfil 
their national security obligations. As attribution 
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of the cause of a computer disruption, however, 
is difficult to ascertain in the short-term, then 
more information about both vulnerabilities and 
threats is required to improve information 
security. The surveys of the Gartner Group and 
the Washington D.C. Year 2000 Group were 
embryonic examples of how some IT informa-
tion might be obtained. Some of the many 
international schemes to monitor and share 
information about Y2K disruptions over the 
rollover period are now being developed further 
to deal with other developments in IT and its 
security. These schemes included that of the 
IYCC the development of which the July 2000 
UN ECOSOC substantive meeting discussed. 
The successor to the IYCC's global network of 
national Y2K coordinators might now focus on 
other IT issues, such as building communica-
tions infrastructure in developing countries and 
promoting e-commerce in others. The scheme 
set up to monitor Y2K disruptions in civil 
nuclear power plants might be considered by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to deal with 
other types of accidents or incidents. Such 
information sharing enables government officials 
or company Directors and Chief Executive 
Officers to make decisions to mitigate or reduce 
potential destabilizing effects as a result of 
computer incidents, especially as IT systems are 
increasingly global and interconnected. 
While the Y2K experience will not solve all 
future information security issues, it went a long 
way to demonstrating how effectively govern-
ments and industry worldwide can work to-
gether to deal with the large-scale and complex 
IT issues likely to occur as economies and trade 
become increasingly interdependent. 
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hensive Strategy Can Draw on Year 2000 
Experiences (GAO/AJMD-OO-I, Oclober 1999); 
the UK also produced an excellent report 
focusing more on IT infrastructure critical for 
government computer systems and e-commerce 
in Modernising Government in Action: Realising 
the Benefits of Y2K, Cabinel Office report 10 
Parliamenl, Command Paper 4703 (London: 
HMSO, April 2000). 
"For example, see Timothy Braithwaite, Y2K 
Lessons Learned: A Guide to Better Information 
Technology Management (New York: John WHey 
& Sons, Inc, 2000). 
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